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I V 
ARGUMENT 
I. "Final completion" as used in section 38-1-11 should be given its plain 
meaning; there is a meaningful difference between "completion" and 
"final completion" in Utah law. 
Wells Fargo's objection to a literal reading of "final completion" is contrary to well-
established principles of statutory interpretation and should be rejected. "When interpreting a 
statute, it is axiomatic that this court's primary goal 'is to give effect to the legislature's intent in 
light of the purpose that the statute was meant to achieve' ... This court looks first to the plain 
language of a statute when deciding questions of statutory interpretation and assumes that each 
term was used advisedly by the legislature ... Similarly, statutory construction presumes that the 
expression of one should be interpreted as the exclusion of another ... Therefore, omissions in 
statutory language should 'be taken note of and given effect.' " Biddle v. Washington Terrace 
City, 993 P.2d 875, 879 (Utah 1999) (citations omitted). 
There is no ambiguity in the wording of section 38-1-11 which would require the court to 
look beyond the plain language of the statute to determine its meaning, or preclude the court 
from consulting a dictionary for assistance in finding the plain meaning of the statutory 
language. Nor is this a new task for the court. In Totorica v. Thomas, 397 P.2d 984 (Utah 1965), 
this court rejected the owner's contention that the builder's foreclosure action was untimely 
because it was not filed within twelve months of a 30-day suspension of work on the project. 
The court interpreted the then current version of the mechanic's lien statute literally to give the 
builder the option to file its foreclosure action either within "twelve months after completion of 
the original contract, or the suspension of work thereunder for a period of thirty days." 
(Emphasis added). In support of its holding, the court looked to the dictionary definition of "or" 
1 
and the purpose of Utah's mechatre's lien statute, and upheld the literal meaning of the statute. 
The court wrote: 
As stated in Webster's Unabridged New International Dictionary, 2d ed., 
the conjunctive 'or' is a '* * * co-ordinating particle that marks an 
alternative * * * that is, you may do one of the things at your pleasure, but 
not both * * *.' The Mechanic's Lien Law was made for the benefit of 
those who perform the labor and supply the materials. To place 
appellant's interpretation on the meaning of this section would be to 
minimize a lien claimant's remedy without a clear mandate from the 
legislature requiring such an effect ... Were we to sustain appellant's 
contention we would emasculate the rights granted a lien claimant under 
the provisions of Section 38-1-7, U.C.A.1953 ... 
Totorica at 986. Using this approach to interpreting section 38-1-11, the plain language of the 
statute requires mechanic's lien claimants to file suit to foreclose their mechanic's lien no later 
than twelve months after final completion of an original contract not involving a residence. The 
plain meaning of "final completion" is that a contract is not finally complete until everything 
required to be done under the contract is complete. Because there is no dispute McKell's 
contract with Carter was not finally complete on or before November 21, 2000, McKell's lien 
foreclosure action, filed on November 21, 2001, was timely, and Judge Laycock's contrary 
ruling should be reversed. 
The distinction between "final completion" and "completion" is as significant as the 
distinction between "final completion" and "substantial completion." Case law interpreting 
"completion" in the context of Utah's mechanic's lien statute established a two-part test for 
determining whether an original contractor's work was complete for purposes of recording a 
mechanic's lien: first, whether the project was substantially complete; and second, whether the 
project was accepted by the owner. Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith 
Assocs., 827 P.2d 963, 965 (Uiah Ct. App. 1992) (interpreting version of statute requiring the 
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original contractor to record rs mi :hanic's lien within 100 days after completing its contract) . 
However, the legislature specii cally amended the mechanic's lien statute to require all claimants 
on non-residential projects to file their foreclosure action within twelve months after final 
completion of the original contract. 1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) (codified as amended at 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-11). Presumably, the legislature was aware of Utah cases interpreting 
"completion" and deliberately elected to use "final completion" as the triggering event for 
recording a lien and filing the foreclosure action. 
II. The legislature rejected the concepts of cessation or abandonment of 
work as events to trigger the filing of a mechanic's lien foreclosure action 
in Utah.2 
When Utah's legislature amended the mechanic's lien statute in the 1994 General 
Session, it rejected the position advocated by Wells Fargo. The mechanic's lien statute in effect 
prior to those amendments allowed mechanic's lien claimants to file their foreclosure actions 
within twelve months after suspension of work on the project for a period of thirty days. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 38-1-11. "In some states, the mechanic's lien statutes meet the problem of 
abandonment of construction or of the contract by measuring the time for filing claims from the 
cessation of work rather than from actual completion of work or of a building or improvement." 
Maurice T. Brunner, LL.B., Annotation, Abandonment of Construction or of Contract as 
Affecting Time for Filing Mechanics' Liens or Time for Giving Notice to Owner, 52 A.L.R. 3d 
1
 Interiors Contracting is not a case involving the timeliness of a lien foreclosure action, but 
then, neither are any of the cases cited by Wells Fargo at 52 A.L.R. 3d 797. See Wells Fargo's 
Brief at 11. 
2
 Throughout its brief, Wells i?aigo attempts to couch the issues in terms of abandonment and 
cessation. Neither abandonment nor cessation of work was specifically raised in the parties' 
pleadings or memoranda supporting or opposing the Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings. 
Nevertheless, the court read the issue of abandonment into the record when it ruled. 
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797, 817 (1973) (emphasis added). In the 1994 General Session, Utah's elected representatives 
amended sections 38-1-11, deleting the reference to the thirty-day suspension of work as a 
triggering event for filing a lien foreclosure action and instead, requiring lien foreclosure actions 
to be filed within "twelve months from the date the lien claimant last performed labor and 
services or last furnished equipment or material on an original contract not involving a 
residence." 1994 Utah Laws Ch. 308 (S.B. 87) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
11). 
To adopt Wells Fargo's position would be to take two steps backwards, to revert to a 
version of the statute specifically amended by the legislature almost a decade ago. Subsequent to 
the 1994 amendments, the 1995 General Session amended the mechanic's lien statute again to 
require lien claimants to file their foreclosure actions within twelve months after final 
completion of an original contract not involving a residence. 1995 Utah Laws Ch. 172 (S.B. 
115) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§38-1-11). The legislature did not then and has 
not subsequently reintroduced the concepts of cessation or abandonment of work as events 
triggering the timing of a lien foreclosure action. Because the legislature omitted the period of a 
thirty day suspension of work as a triggering event to file a lien foreclosure action in the 1994 
amendments, this court can conclude that the legislature did not intend for a suspension of work, 
or cessation or abandonment of the work, to trigger the time for lien claimants to file a 
foreclosure action. Biddle v. Washington Terrace City, supra. 
For this court to adopt a rule reinstating a provision of the statute explicitly deleted by the 
legislature would run contrary to the legislative intent expressed in the 1994 amendment and 
deprive McKell of a remedy expressly provided by the mechanic's lien statute. "When faced 
with a question of statutory construction, 'we seek to give effect to the intent of the legislature in 
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light of the purpose the act was meant to achieve.' Wilcox v. CSX Corp., 70 P.3d 85, 90 (Utah 
2003); quoting State v. Ostler, 31 P.3d 528, 530 (quoting Gutierrez v. Medley, 972 P.2d 913, 915 
(Utah 1998)). The public policy behind the right to a mechanics' lien is to provide protection for 
those who enhance the value of property by supplying labor and materials. Projects Unlimited v. 
Copper State Thrift & Loan Co., 798 P.2d 738, 743 (Utah 1990); AAA Fencing Co. v. Raintree 
Dev. & Energy Co., 714 P.2d 289 (Utah 1986); FOR-SHOR Co. v. Early, 828 P.2d 1080, 1082 
(Utah Ct App. 1992); Interiors Contracting, Inc. v. Smith, Halander & Smith Assocs., 827 P.2d. 
963, 965 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). Once statutory provisions have been satisfied, Utah's judicial 
policy is to broadly construe the mechanic's lien statute to protect those who add value to 
another's property. J. V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. Kampros, 971 P.2d 8, 13-14 (Utah Ct. App. 
1998); Interiors Contracting, Inc., 827 P.2d. at 965. The modern trend is to dispense with 
arbitrary rules which have no demonstrable value in a particular fact situation. Projects 
Unlimited, 798 P.2d at 744. A mechanic's lien once acquired by labor performed on an 
improvement with the owner's consent should not be defeated by technicalities when no rights of 
others are infringed and no express command of the statute is disregarded. Id. (emphasis added). 
Judge Laycock should not be allowed to undo what the legislature achieved in the 1994 
amendment. The court should reverse and remand this case for further proceedings. 
Judge Laycock committed reversible error when she ruled McKell abandoned or ceased 
work when it recorded the mechanic's lien, and that abandonment and cessation are tantamount 
to "final completion" under Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-1 l(l)(a). First, in considering Wells Fargo's 
motion, McKell was entitled to have the facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts 
construed in McKell's favor. Ahlstrom v. Salt Lake City Corp., 73 P.2d 315 (Utah 2003); Arnold 
Indus., Inc. v. Love, 63 P.2d 721 (Utah 2002). But, Judge Laycock improperly inferred that 
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McKell had ceased or abandoned the work when McKell recorded the mechanic's lien. Second, 
no Utah case, and no case cited by Wells Fargo3, holds that abandonment or cessation of work is 
synonymous with final completion of the work. Wells Fargo cites Govert Copier Painting v. 
Van Leeuwen, 801 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) for the proposition that the court should use 
the date listed on the notice of lien to determine the date from which the statute of repose should 
run where the date of final completion cannot be determined. But, Govert stands for the 
proposition that the owner's use of a lien claimants' materials left at the job site (with the express 
understanding the owner would use the materials to complete the claimants' work) could not be 
used to extend the time within which the claimant could file suit to foreclose its mechanic's lien. 
In Govert, there was no dispute that the lien claimant's last labor occurred as set forth on its lien, 
because the lien claimant had no intention of returning to the site, having reached agreement with 
the owner that the owner would complete the claimants' work using materials left by the 
claimant. There is no evidence of such an agreement or arrangement between McKell and Carter 
Construction. In Projects Unlimited, supra., also cited by Wells Fargo, the issues of cessation or 
abandonment of the work, or even the timeliness of the foreclosure action, were simply not 
before the court. 
III. The legislature rejected using the last day of claimant's work as an event 
to trigger the filing of a mechanic's lien foreclosure action in Utah. 
Utah's legislature rejected the position adopted by the trial court and now advocated by 
Wells Fargo when it amended Utah's mechanic's lien statute in the 1995 General Session. 
Before the 1995 General Session, lien claimants were required to record their lien "within 90 
3
 Case law from foreign jurisdictions is inapplicable because of the unique language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 38-1-11(1 )(a) requiring final completion of an original contract before the statute of 
repose begins to run. 
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days from the date the person last performed labor or service or last furnished equipment or 
material on a project or improvement" and to foreclose the lien within "twelve months from the 
date the lien claimant last performed labor and services or last furnished equipment or material 
on an original contract not involving a residence ..." Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11. In the 
1995 General Session, the legislature changed the triggering event for recording and foreclosing 
a mechanic's lien on a non-residential project. Effective May 1, 1995, lien claimants were 
required to record their lien within "90 days from the date.. .of final completion of an original 
contract not involving a residence..." and to foreclose the lien within "twelve months from the 
date of final completion of the original contract not involving a residence..." 1995 Utah Laws 
Ch. 172 (S.B. 115) (codified as amended at Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-1-7 & 11. Because the 
legislature deleted the requirement for lien claimants to file their foreclosure action within twelve 
months after last furnishing labor, materials, equipment or services to a project in the 1995 
amendments, this court can conclude that the legislature did not intend for the repose period to 
run from the last furnishing of labor, materials, equipment or services to a project. Biddle v. 
Washington Terrace City, supra. Judge Laycock's conclusion that the last day McKell furnished 
labor to the project (as listed on the mechanic's lien form) is the same as final completion of 
McKell's contract is entirely contrary to the legislature's intent as reflected in the amended 
language, and if left intact, could result in more mechanic's liens filed on projects, unnecessarily 
clouding title to real property. Consequently, the court should reverse and remand for further 
proceedings. 
Judge Laycock's conclusion and ruling is also contrary to Utah case law. The last day of 
work listed on the mechanic's lien form is not dispositive on the issue of final completion. 
Listing the last day of work is a requirement of Utah's mechanic's lien statute, Utah Code Ann. § 
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38-1-7, but means nothing more than that. The last day of work on the lien form is the last day 
the claimant provided labor, equipment, materials or services for the project at the time the lien 
was recorded, not the day the claimant's contract or work was necessarily finally complete. In 
Roberts v. Hansen, 479 P.2d 345 (Utah 1971), the court held that completion occurred for 
purposes of filing a lien foreclosure action when the owner terminated the builder, not on the 
earlier date of last work listed on the builder's lien. See also, J. V. Hatch Constr., Inc. v. 
Kampros, 971 P.2d 8 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (builders' contract completed upon owner's 
termination of contract). 
IV. Even if abandonment and cessation are the functional equivalents of final 
completion, Judge Laycock's decision should still be reversed because the 
determination of whether a project was abandoned is a material question 
of fact.4 
Judge Laycock's ruling should be reversed because, in Utah, "[t]he determination of what 
constitutes material abandonment is a factual issue." Ketchum, Konkel, Barrett, Nickel & Austin 
v. Heritage Mountain Dev. Co., 784 P.2d 1217, 1225 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). "Abandonment of 
work will not be presumed where the right to a mechanic's lien is in question, but must be 
established by the evidence, and is ordinarily a question of fact." Brunner, supra, at 803. Even if 
The issues of abandonment and cessation of work are preserved for purposes of this appeal 
because the court raised the issue sua sponte and clearly had an opportunity to review the merits 
of the issues or clear any error as required. R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 40 P.3d 1119, 1124 (Utah 
2002). For an issue to be properly preserved for appellate review, it must "be raised to a level of 
consciousness such that the trial judge can consider it... the 'mere mention' of an issue without 
introducing supporting evidence or relevant legal authority does not preserve that issue for 
appeal." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358. 361 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). Judge Laycock raised the 
issues of cessation and abandonment when she issued her bench ruling that: ".. .the cessation and 
abandonment by a mechanic's lien claimant of work to be performed under a contract also 
constitutes final completion of the original contract..." (Record at 85-86.) Consequently, the 
issues of abandonment and cessation of work are sufficiently preserved for purposes of this 
appeal. Ellis v. Swensen, 16 P.3d 1233 (Utah 2000). 
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this court were to adopt the ml. /A abandonment or cessation of the work is the function 
equivalent of final completio t >f le original contract, "the rule cannot be invoked unless it is 
shown when the abandonment occurred." Id. at 812. 
McKell respectfully suggests that determining when the alleged abandonment of the 
contract occurred is a genuine i ;r,ie of material fact which should have precluded Judge Laycock 
from granting Wells Fargo's motion for summary judgment. In reaching her conclusion, Judge 
Laycock ignored the jurisprudence on summary judgment motions and viewed the facts and the 
inferences from those facts in a light most favorable to Wells Fargo, not McKell. Ahlstrom v. 
Salt Lake City Corp., supra.; Arnold Indus., Inc. v. Love, supra. Consequently, this court should 
reverse and remand for further proceedings. 
CONCLUSION 
McKell respectfully requests the court to reverse Judge Laycock and to remand the case 
for further proceedings. 
DATED this _£^ day of September 2003. 
PETERSON REED & WARLAUMONT L.L.C 
J Jack W. Reed 
^ M a r k S. Middlemas 
Counsel for R.A. McKell Excavating, Inc. 
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